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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78A-4-l 03(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue 1: Was a new finding by this Court barred under the doctrines of claims

preclusion and res judicata, due to the earlier findings by Commissioner Blomquist
pertaining to the same incident?
Standard of Review: Whether res judicata bars an action presents a question of

law. Macris &Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93,117, 16 P.3d 1214. Claim
preclusion "bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent action a claim that has been
fully litigated previously." State v. Sommerville, 2013 UT App 40, 130, 297 P.3d 665
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A prior judgment has a preclusive effect
when a later lawsuit "is entirely predicated on the same set of operative facts and the
same alleged injury." Nipper v. Douglas, 2004 UT App 118, 110, 90 P.3d 649. In other
words, claim preclusion applies when "the issues are the same, the facts are the same, and
the evidence is the same as in the previous litigation." Id. 1 11 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Claim preclusion applies when three elements are satisfied:
(1) both suits must involve the same parties or their privies, (2) the claim that is alleged to
be barred must have been presented in the first suit or be one that could and should have
been raised in the first action, and (3) the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment
on the merits. Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 2012 UT 42,121,285
P .3d 1157 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The third element is relevant
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to both claim preclusion and issue preclusion because "both ... require that the first suit
must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits." Sommerville, 2013 UT App 40, iJ
31, 297 P.3d 665 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Peterson v. Armstrong,
2014 UT App 247, iJ 11,337 P.3d 1058, 1062.

Preservation of Issue on Appeal: The issue concerning whether res judicata and
claims preclusion apply to this case was expressly addressed by Appellant's counsel at
the outset of a hearing on Appellant's Partial Objection to Commissioner's
Recommendation, held on February 16, 2016 (the "Hearing"). Specifically, counsel: (a)
informed the Court that Appellant had requested a protective order in another proceeding,
Case No. 154907374, and that a protective against Appellee had issued; and (b) provided
the Court with a copy of Peterson v. Armstrong, and argued that res judicata and claims
preclusion applies to this case. (Record ("R.") 365-370). The Court reviewed Peterson,
and expressly ruled that the case did not apply. (R. 372, 438). Thus, the Record is clear
that this issue was addressed by the Court.

Issue 2: Did the Court err in disregarding the findings of Commissioner
Blomquist in an earlier protective order hearing involving the same incident, and in
failing to comply with Utah Code Ann. §78B-7-108 pertaining to mutual protective
orders?

Standard of Appellate Review: "A trial court's interpretation and application of
a statute is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness." Blackner v. State Dept. of

Trans. 2002 UT 44, 48 P.3d 949.
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Utah Code Ann. §78B-7-108 (mutual protective orders prohibited), except under
certain circumstances.
Preservation of Issue on Appeal: The Court on its own initiative raised the issue
of the application of this statutory section, in the early stages of the Hearing when the
Court noted that:

•

THE COURT: " ... So in this case we have a protective order that was also issued,
at least recommended or it's in effect with Judge Casey- or Commissioner
Casey, correct?
MR. LEWIS: That's correct.
THE COURT: So if the status quo continues, Mr. Jensen, which means in effect
there are competing protective orders, which the Legislature says can't happen
unless there's certain conditions that are met, ... " (R. 370).
While the Court did not expressly reference the applicable statutory provision, it is clear
from the Court's language that it was aware of the application of Utah Code Ann. §78B-

•
'

7-108, which applies to "mutual protective orders." Given the Court's acknowledgment,
it is clear this issue was preserved.
Issue 3: Did the Court err by refusing to grant Appellant a short continuance to
allow him to secure the testimony of key, independent witnesses for the Hearing?
Standard of Review: "Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b) provides that the granting of a
continuance lies in the trial court's discretion ... However, it is in accord with the most
fundamental traditions of our legal system that a party should be afforded every
reasonable opportunity to be in attendance at his trial." Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d

269, 273, 373 P.2d 375, 377-78 (1962).
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"Nevertheless, an abuse of discretion may be found if a party has "made timely
objections, [has] given necessary notice, and has made a reasonable effort to have the
trial date changed for good cause." Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, 143, 16 P.3d 540,
549.
Preservation of Issue on Appeal: The issue concerning whether a continuance
should be granted to Appellant, was the subject of two motions to continue filed prior to
the Hearing by substitute counsel (R. 277-278, 298-299), and was argued extensively at
the outset of the Hearing and addressed throughout the Hearing (R. 366-368, 373,
428). It is clear this issue was preserved.
DETERMINATIVE CONSITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
The relevant portions of the Utah Code and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are
included hereto including:
Utah Code Ann. §78B-7-107:
Hearings on ex parte orders.
(l)(a) When a court issues an ex parte protective order the court shall set a date for
a hearing on the petition within 20 days after the ex parte order is issued.
(b) If at that hearing the court does not issue a protective order, the ex parte
protective order shall expire, unless it is otherwise extended by the court.
Extensions beyond the 20-day period may not by granted unless:
(i) the petitioner is unable to be present at the hearing;
(ii) the respondent has not been served;
(iii) the respondent has had the opportunity to present a defense at the
hearing;
(iv) the respondent requests that the ex parte order be extended; or
(v) exigent circumstances exist.
( c) Under no circumstances may an ex parte order be extended beyond 180 days
from the date of initial issuance.
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•
(d) If at that hearing the court issues a protective order, the ex parte protective
order remains in effect until service of process of the protective order is
completed.
(e) A protective order issued after notice and a hearing is effective until further
order of the court.
(t) If the hearing on the petition is heard by a commissioner, either the petitioner
or respondent may file an objection within 10 days of the entry of the
recommended order and the assigned judge shall hold a hearing within 20 days of
the filing of the objection.
(2) Upon a hearing under this section, the court may grant any of the relief
described in Section 78B-7-l 06.
(3) When a court denies a petition for an ex parte protective order or a petition to
modify an order for protection ex parte, upon the request of the petitioner, the
court shall set the matter for hearing and notify the petitioner and serve the
respondent.
(4) A respondent who has been served with an ex parte protective order may seek
to vacate the ex parte protective order prior to the hearing scheduled pursuant to
Subsection (I )(a) by filing a verified motion to vacate. The respondent's verified
motion to vacate and a notice of hearing on that motion shall be personally served
on the petitioner at least two days prior to the hearing on the motion to vacate.
Utah Code Ann. §78B-7-108:

Mutual protective orders prohibited.
(I) A court may not grant a mutual order or mutual orders for protection to
opposing parties, unless each party:
(a) has filed an independent petition against the other for a protective order,
and both petitions have been served;
(b) makes a showing at a due process protective order hearing of abuse or
domestic violence committed by the other party; and
(c) demonstrates the abuse or domestic violence did not occur in selfdefense.
(2) If the court issues mutual protective orders, the circumstances justifying those
orders shall be documented in the case file.
Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b):

Scheduling and Postponing a Trial.
(b) Postponement. The court may postpone a trial for good cause upon such terms
as are just, including the payment of costs.
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Utah R. Civ. P. lOl(n):
(n) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of a
court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court. A party
may object to the recommendation by filing an objection under Rule 108.

Utah R. Civ. P. 108(a):
(a) A recommendation of a court commissioner is the order of the court until
modified by the court. A party may file a written objection to the recommendation
within 14 days after the recommendation is made in open court or, if the court
commissioner takes the matter under advisement, within 14 days after the minute
entry of the recommendation is served. A judge's counter-signature on the
commissioner's recommendation does not affect the review of an objection.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the Case
This appeal is from the final order of Judge Paul G. Maughan, the Third District

Court, Salt Lake County, at a hearing on February 16, 2016 (the "Hearing"), denying
Appellant's objection to the recommendation of Commissioner T. Patrick Casey
("Commissioner Casey") and entering a protective order case against Appellant
pertaining to a physical altercation involving Appellee and Appellant on October 21,
2015 (the "Incident") (the "Order"). This appeal challenges the appropriateness of the
Order, in light of a previous protective order issued against Appellee arising from the
Incident. Appellant argues in this brief that this Order was barred by the doctrines of res
judicata and claims preclusion, and that the Court failed to properly apply Utah Code
Ann. §78B-7-108, which applies to mutual protective orders involving the same parties.

Appellant also challenges the Court's refusal to grant Appellant's motions to continue the
Hearing, to allow Appellant a fair opportunity to prepare and to subpoena and call key
witnesses who witnessed the Incident.
6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

•
II.

The Course of Proceedings

As a result of a hearing on November 30, 2015, in Commissioner Blomquist's
Court, a protective order was entered against Appellee in Case No. 154907374,
pertaining to a request for a protective order filed by Appellant pertaining to an
altercation on October 21, 2015 between Appellee and Appellant (the "First Protective
Order"). (A copy of the First Protective Order is included in the Addendum hereto).
Appellee did not object to or challenge the First Protective Order, which consequently
became a permanent order.
Subsequently, a hearing was held in Commissioner Casey's Court on an ex parte
protective order resulting from a request for a protective order filed by Appellee,
pertaining in part to the Incident. As a result of this hearing, Commissioner Casey
recommended a protective order against Appellant. On December 17, 2015, Appellant
timely objected to this recommendation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78B-7-107(l)(f),
which objection was amended on December 22, 2015, and the Court scheduled a hearing
on the objection for February 16, 2016. Appellant engaged new counsel, Ross Anderson,
and subsequently James C. Lewis, on February 8 and February 9, 2016, both of whom
immediately filed, on entry of appearance, motions to continue the hearing, based on the
need to have time to adequately prepare for the hearing, and, more importantly, to enable
them to subpoena key witnesses, including eyewitnesses to the Incident. (R. 277-278;
297-299). The Court did not act on these motions prior to the Hearing.
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III.

Disposition in the Trial Court
At the Hearing, Appellant's counsel renewed Appellant's motions to continue, and

argued that, because of the First Protective Order, and under Peterson v. Armstrong, the
doctrines of res judicata and claims preclusion would bar the protective order against
Appellee. The trial court determined that: (a) Appellant's request for a continuance
would be denied; (b) Peterson v. Armstrong did not apply to this case; and (c) the
protective order against Appellant would be granted. (R. 43 7-441 ).

As a result,

Appellant has appealed.

IV.

•

Statement of Facts
On October 21, 2015, a physical altercation occurred at the home of Sonya Ruflin,

mother of Appellant, between Appellant and Appellee (the "Incident"). As a result of the
Incident, Appellant suffered injuries. (R. 387-396).
On November 12, 2015, Appellant filed a Request for a Protective Order against
Appellee pertaining to the Incident. (R. 65-72). The request was heard by Commissioner
Michelle Blomquist ("Commissioner Blomquist") on November 30, 2015, Third District
Court Case No. 154907374 (the "Initial Protective Order Hearing"). Appellant and
Appellee both attended the Initial Protective Order Hearing. At the conclusion of the
Initial Protective Order Hearing, Commissioner Blomquist granted the protective order
against Appellee. (The "First Protective Order"). (See First Protective Order in the
Addendum attached hereto). The Court found that the evidence supported a finding,
among other things, that Appellee was the aggressor in the Incident, and that the evidence
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•

supported a finding that Appellee had initiated a violent assault on Appellant. (R. 369). 1
Appellee did not object to Commissioner Blomquist's findings, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78B-7-107(l)(f), Utah R. Civ. P. lOl(n) and Utah R. Civ. P. 108(a), so the
protective order is permanent and remains in effect.
Appellee also filed a Request for a Protective Order pertaining in large part to the
same Incident, in Case No. 154906899 ("Second Protective Order Action"), which was
heard by Commissioner Casey on December 3, 2015 (the "Second Protective Order
Hearing"). (R. 1-6). At the conclusion of the Second Protective Order Hearing,
Commissioner Casey did not overturn the First Protective Order against Appellee, but
found that there was a sufficient basis for a protective order against Appellant. (R. 43 7441 ). However, this finding was based on allegations pertaining to events that predated
and were totally unrelated to the Incident. (R. 177-178). Appellant filed a Partial
Objection to the Protective Order on December 17, 2015 (R. 175-182), which was
amended on December 22, 2015 (R. 227-232). On February 3, 2016, or approximately
thirty-six (36) days after the Objection that Judge Maughan scheduled an evidentiary
hearing for February 16, 2016. (R. 271).
Appellant was initially represented by Wall & Wall. On February 8, 2016, Ross
C. Anderson entered an appearance in the matter (R. 273-274), and on the same date Mr.

1

These statements were made by Appellant's counsel at the Hearing based on the
transcript of the hearing of Commissioner Blomquist, which transcript was rejected by
Judge Maughan. The Court subsequently acknowledged that it had read that finding (R.
369:5-15).
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Anderson filed on behalf of Appellant, a motion to continue the hearing scheduled for
February 16, 2016. (R. 277-278). The bases stated in the motion to continue were that:
(a) Mr. Anderson had been retained as counsel that day (February 8, 2016); (b) there
were "eyewitnesses to the attack by Petitioner against Respondent [who] must be located
and subpoenaed for the de novo evidentiary hearing"; and (c) new counsel was unable to
adequately prepare and appear at the hearing as currently scheduled. (R. 277-278).
On February 9, 2016, Mr. Anderson filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel,
noting that a "conflict of interest has been identified within [his firm]," (R. 289-290), and
on the same date James C. Lewis, LEWIS HANSEN PLESHE FLANDERS LLC, entered an
appearance (R. 293-294). The following day, on Wednesday, February 10, 2016,
Appellant through new counsel filed a Renewed Motion to Continue the Hearing on
February 16, 2016, on the same grounds as the earlier motion to continue, and further
noting that "Respondent's new counsel needs at least two (2) weeks to subpoena
witnesses, and will be involved in trial preparation for a trial scheduled for March 15-17,
2016." (R. 298-299). The firm of Wall & Wall, which had not been involved in the case
since December, 2015, formally withdrew on February 10, 2016 (R. 304-305). Appellant
submitted a Request to Submit for Decision on the Motion to Continue on February 11,
2016, noting that "Petitioner has filed no response to the Motion but, as previously
indicated, a protective order is currently in place, so Petitioner will suffer no prejudice if
this motion is granted." (R. 318-319).
The Hearing on Appellant's objection was held on February 16, 2016, or a full
fifty-one (51) days after the Objection was filed. Utah Code Ann. §78B-7-107(1)(±)
10
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requires a hearing "within 20 days of the filing of an objection," but the Court neither
sought nor obtained the waiver or consent of the parties to a hearing beyond the twentyday requirement.

•

At the outset of the Hearing, Appellant's counsel began by renewing Appellant's
earlier motion for a continuance, indicating that he had only entered an appearance days
earlier on February 10, 2016; that he had been scheduled to be out of town in the days
leading up to the hearing; that there had been insufficient time to subpoena or call key,
independent witnesses who were present at the time of the Incident, and who had
observed that Appellee was the aggressor who had initiated an assault on Appellant; and
that counsel had sought the stipulation of Respondent, who had refused to stipulate to a
continuance. (R. 365-369).
Appellant's counsel also noted that this hearing involved the same parties, the
same facts and circumstances and the same issues as an earlier protective order hearing
brought under a Request for Protective Order by Appellant and heard in Commissioner
Blomquist's Court in the First Protective Order Hearing. (R. 365-366). Counsel noted
that as a result of the First Protective Order Hearing, a protective order against Appellee
was issued by Commissioner Blomquist, who found Appellee to be the aggressor in the
Incident. (R. 369). Appellant counsel further noted that because of the limitation of time
since his engagement just a few days earlier, he had been unable to obtain a court
transcript of the earlier protective order hearings, but offered transcripts of the
recommendations of Commissioners Blomquist and Casey prepared by his legal assistant
from recordings of the hearings, and as to which she had and sworn to the accuracy of the
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transcriptions. (R. 365). Counsel offered the transcripts to the Court for its consideration
in understanding the context of what had transpired to date in these proceedings, and
further offered to have his assistant testify concerning the accuracy of the transcriptions.
The Court refused to consider these transcriptions (or to have the assistant testify),
because they were "done in-house" and "not done by an independent court reporter." (R.
372).
Appellant counsel also argued that the issues presented by the protective order, at
least as it pertains to the Incident, had already been adjudicated in Commissioner
Blomquist's court, and that the protective order in this case should be barred under claims
preclusion and res judicata principles. Counsel noted that no objection to the First
Protective Order was filed by Appellee. Counsel provided the Court and Respondent
with a copy of Peterson v. Armstrong, 2014 UT App 247, 337 P.3d 1058, a 2014 Utah
Court of Appeals case which addressed the issues of claims preclusion and res judicata in
the context of a civil stalking injunction, arguing that under Peterson Appellee' s claims
were barred under the doctrines of res judicata and claims preclusion. (R. 366-367).
Appellant counsel indicated to the Court that he would like the opportunity to brief the
issue to explain why the matter was barred under claims preclusion- which was another
reason for the requested continuance. (R. 367). Instead, the Court took a recess to read
the case, and when the hearing re-adjourned the Court indicated that he had concluded
Peterson did not apply. (R. 372).

In addressing the question of whether a continuance should be granted in the
hearing, the Court asked Appellee if he would be willing to stipulate to a continuance,
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and in doing so noted that "So, if the status quo continues, Mr. Jensen, which means in
effect there are competing protective orders, which the legislature says can't happen
unless there's certain conditions that are met, but that nevertheless for- if there's no
harm to you, are you willing to continue this?" (R. 370). The Court then later again
inquired of Mr. Jensen as to whether he would be inclined to stipulate to a continuance:
"My question is, if we-if the two orders stay in effect until we hear this, does that cause
you any grief at this point?" (R. 3 71 ). In response to an inquiry from the Court,
Respondent indicated he would not agree to a continuance, despite the observation by the
Court that Respondent would, during any such continuance, continue to have a protective
order in place. (R. 370-372).
The Hearing then proceeded. Appellee began with his testimony, which pertained
only to the Incident. (R. 374-378). At the conclusion of Appellee's testimony, Appellee
rested his case. (R. 385). Appellant's counsel then took testimony from Appellant,
followed by the testimony of Appellant's mother, Sonya Ruflin, both of whom were cross
examined by Appellee. (R. 386-411). During Appellee's cross examination of Sonya
Ruflin, he asked the Court if he could call his wife as a witness, notwithstanding that he
had rested his case. The Court responded "sure," indicating that the witness Appellee
wanted to call was "rebuttal," notwithstanding that Appellee had not offered any reason
for calling her, rebuttal or otherwise. (R. 411-412). Appellant's counsel voiced his
concerns about the propriety of allowing Appellee to "reopen" his case, to which the
Court summoned counsel to the bench and instructed him that he was going to "let
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•
[Appellee] put on rebuttal." (R. 412). 2 As a result, when it became apparent to
Appellant's counsel that the Court was allowing Appellee to re-open the case to cover
new material, Appellant then indicated he intended to call two additional witnesses,
Christopher Ruflin, Appellant's brother, and Dave Gunnarson. (R. 412). Christopher
Ruflin testified concerning unrelated and earlier events involving Appellee and
Appellant, which the Court determined were not relevant to his findings. (R. 412-418).
When Appellant attempted to call Dave Gunnarson to provide corroborating evidence
concerning Appellant's injuries as a result of the Incident, the Court indicated its
disinclination to hear additional evidence that was "cumulative," and consequently Mr.
Gunnarson was not called to testify. (R. 419-420).
Although the Court indicated to Appellant's counsel his disinclination to consider
testimony concerning events years earlier (R. 416:18-20; R. 417:1-3, 12-14), he then
allowed Appellee to call Kathy Jensen to testify concerning the same things - prior
events. (R. 421-422). Kathy Jensen was not present during the Incident, and had no
direct knowledge of the events pertaining to the Incident. (R. 427). Her direct testimony
pertained to alleged "text messages" from Appellant to her pertaining to an unrelated
event in 2014, which were not offered as exhibits by Appellee or saved by the witness.

2

Kathy Jensen, Appellee's wife and Appellant's sister, was called by Appellee as a
witness at the conclusion of Appellant's case, supposedly as "rebuttal," at least according
to the Court. (Appellee did not indicate to the Court the reason he wanted to call her after
resting his case). However, it is clear from her subsequent testimony that she was not
present during, and had no direct knowledge of, the Incident. Consequently, her
testimony did not serve to rebut the testimony of Appellant or Sonya Ruflin, but rather to
testify concerning other matters that had no connection with the Incident. (R. 421-437).
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(R. 421-423). While this line of testimony also pertained to events long before the
Incident, as to which the Court had expressed reservations when Appellant was
presenting his case, the Court expressed no problems with the presentation of this
evidence by Appellee. (R. 421-423 ).
Prior to the hearing before Commissioner Casey, each party had submitted
proposed exhibits. Appellant submitted Exhibits A-W, which included: (a) medical
records reflecting injuries to Appellant from the Incident (R. 83-113); and (b) witness
statements, including eyewitness statements from persons who were present at the time of
the Incident (R. 73-75, 80-81 ). Appellee later submitted ( on February 11, 2016), Exhibits

•

A-I, which included witness statements and other documents; however, such documents
were not scanned by the trial court and are not part of the Record. (R. 313). During the
Hearing, the Court indicated that exhibits that had been previously "submitted" by
Appellee, were "part of the record" (R. 423), without any testimony pertaining to these
records from Appellee, or request by Appellee that the exhibits be accepted. However,
when Appellant sought to introduce exhibits, such efforts were denied, and the Court
noted, at the end of the Hearing that Appellant: (a) had not presented any medical
evidence showing injuries, notwithstanding that extensive treatment records immediately
following the Incident were submitted (R. 83-113 ); and (b) Appellant did not appear to
have any other witnesses to the Incident, notwithstanding that the materials presented
included eyewitness statements (R. 73-75, 80-81). (R. 438-441).

•

At the conclusion of the Hearing, the Court articulated its reasoning for finding
that the protective order would remain in place:
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1.

The Court denied the request for a continuance by Appellant, indicating

(a)

a continuance was "not necessary"; that "as the Court's previously

that:

indicated, Peterson 3 v. Armstrong does not apply to this case, and there's no res judicata
involved in this" as "It is just not applicable" and "the facts in this case are not applicable
to those in Peterson." (R. 438).
(b)

the Court was "not sure how anyone would be prejudiced by having gone

forward today," stating that "there were three witnesses, main witnesses that observed
what occurred" and that while "there were other roofers there, ... there's no indication to
the Court that any of those were proposed witnesses." 4 (R. 438).

3 The

Court transcript from the Hearing had a typographical error and transcribed the case
as "Pearson" rather than "Peterson."
4

This statement was directly inconsistent with the Record, in a variety of respects. First,
in Appellant's motions for continuance, Appellant indicated that he had "Eyewitnesses to
the attack by Petitioner against Respondent" (referring to the Incident) who "must be
located and subpoenaed for the hearing." (R. 277, 297). Secondly, at the outset of the
Hearing, Appellant's counsel referenced the Motions to Continue, and indicated that: (a)
when Mr. Ross Anderson had entered an appearance "it was too late to send subpoenas
and give sufficient notice to witnesses" (R. 366), and (b) Appellant "needed adequate
time to get some witnesses in here to address these issues," noting that contact had been
made with witnesses who were aware they had not been given sufficient notice under
subpoenas. Finally, the Record includes a statement of one of these witnesses-Pedro
Cruz, who witnessed the Incident and observed that Appellee was the aggressor. (R. 8081 ). The Court expressly stated that he had reviewed the Record (R. 43 7), which
included this statement; consequently, the Court was aware that there was at least one
other independent witness who observed the Incident.
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( c)

there "are statutory requirements to having a hearing on - contesting the

issuance of a protective order," and that "the Court has acted within those to the best of
its ability" 5 ; (R. 438).

•

(d)

Appellant's argument that Appellee "couldn't establish harm or bias" in

granting a continuance was not a "factor in giving a continuance," and Appellee had not
stipulated "to waive the statutory time factors." (R. 438-439).
2.

The Court found Appellee's "version of events" concerning the Incident

"more credible," and based on that finding concluded that "the petitioner has presented
evidence sufficient under the standards set forth in the statute" to "have the protective
order entered against the respondent" (Appellant) (R. 440-441). In making this finding,
the Court noted that: (a) its decision was based on the events pertaining to the Incident
on October 21, 2015, and the Court did not find evidence pertaining to earlier events
"particularly relevant or helpful," nor that such evidence had "played a factor in the
Court's decision" (R. 439); (b) the Court was "very much aware that the petitioner
already has a protective order against him, and this will result in protective orders against
each of them, and rightfully so"; and (c) the Court had reviewed the "Commissioner's
proceedings, Commissioner's order, and finds no reason to overturn that order." 6 (R.

•

441) .

5

However, in noting the statutory requirement, the Court failed to further note that it had
not scheduled the hearing within the required statutory period.
6

It is unclear whether the Court is referring to the "proceedings" and order in the First
Protective Order Hearing in Commissioner Blomquist's Court, or the Second Protective
Order Hearing in Commissioner Casey's Court. However, the Court then refers to "those
17
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•
3.

The Court found that the order should be entered, and "permanently remain

•

that way." (R. 441).
The Court issued a Minute Entry on February 17, 2016, stating that the Court had:
(a) entered its oral findings on the record pursuant to U.R.C.P. 52(a) and determined that
the petitioner had met his burden of establishing that he was entitled to a Protective
Order; (b) the Protective Order previously entered by the Commissioner and the Court
will remain in full force and effect; and (c) that the Minute Entry constitutes "the Order
of the Court regarding the respondent's objection, [and] no further order is required." (R.
326-327). Consequently, the order was a final order of the Court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

•

The First Protective Order issued against Appellee, as a result of a hearing in
Commissioner Blomquist's court, and the subsequent protective order in this case entered
against Appellant by the trial court, pertain to the same Incident on October 22, 2015. 7
Consequently, the same parties and the same facts and circumstances were considered by
both courts. The First Protective Order was not challenged or objected to by Appellee,
and consequently became a final order.

findings in the Court's order as well, which it's free to do under Pingree v. Pingree,"
(441 ), suggesting that the Court was aware of both proceedings. However, the Court
refused to accept or consider Appellant's proposed transcripts of these two hearings, so
while the Court may have reviewed the orders in these two hearings, it does not appear it
had anything else in the "proceedings" available-other than the orders-to consider.
Consequently, it is entirely unclear what the Court was referring to.
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•

•
Appellant contends that the protective order in this case is barred under principles
of res judicata and claims preclusion, and under the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals
in Peterson v. Armstrong, 2014 UT App 247, 337 P.3d 1058. The Court in Peterson
found, in a civil stalking injunction case which is factually similar, that claims preclusion
barred a party from prosecuting in a subsequent action a claim that has been fully
litigated previously, and that a prior judgment has a preclusive effect under the doctrine
of res judicata when a later case is entirely predicated on the same set of operative facts,
and when both actions involve the same parties, the claims have been presented in the
first case (or should have been raised in the first action) and the first action resulted in a
final judgment on the merits. Peterson also held that an order is a "final judgment" when
it constitutes a "declaration of the law as to the respective rights and duties of the parties,
based on facts and evidence upon which the rights of recovery depend, irrespective of the
formal, technical or dilatory objections or contentions" of the parties. In this case, the
First Protective Order involved the same parties, the same facts and circumstances and,
consistent with Peterson, the First Protective Order constitutes a final judgment.
Consequently, the subsequent order from the trial court in this case must be barred.
Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by failing to meet the
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §7 8B-7-108, which contemplates an express finding that
the alleged abuse or domestic violence did not occur in self-defense, and further requires
the trial court to document in the case file the circumstances justifying the existence of
mutual protective orders pertaining to the same incident. The trial court, in the hearing
on this matter, recognized that compliance with this statutory provision was required, by
19
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in its ruling completely failed to articulate findings that meet the requirements of the
statute.
Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying Appellant's motions
to continue the evidentiary hearing on Appellant's Objection. The Record is clear that
Appellant's newly appointed counsel needed additional time to prepare, and to subpoena
and call key witnesses, including eyewitnesses to the subject incident, to testify at the
hearing. While the trial court referenced the statutory requirement for a timely hearing,
the Court did not meet the requirements of the statute in scheduling the hearing.
Consequently, strict compliance with the statutory requirement for a hearing within
twenty (20) days was not met, and the parties waived compliance when a hearing outside
the statutory requirement was scheduled. Neither party would have suffered any
prejudice from an additional continuance of a few days to allow Appellant's new counsel
to prepare and subpoena key witnesses.
ARGUMENT

I.

The Trial Court Erred in its Ruling that Claim Preclusion and Res Judicata
do not apply.
At the outset of the Hearing, Appellant informed the trial court of the issues of

claims preclusion or res judicata applying to Appellee's request for a protective order.
Specifically, Appellant argued that the case of Peterson v. Armstrong applied, which
would, based on the First Protective Order against Appellee, bar this matter from
proceeding.
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The Court took a recess to review the case, and then ruled that the Peterson case
did not apply to this matter, without offering any explanation for the Court's conclusion.
As set forth below, the ruling in Peterson does apply to this case, and would have
the effect of barring the Second Protective Order in the Second Protective Order Hearing.
Although Peterson involves a request for an ex parte civil stalking injunction, it is
factually very similar. The Court in Peterson examined the question of whether the order
in First District Court was a "final order." In Peterson, the former mother in law of a
party (referred to in the case as "Grandmother") filed a request for a civil stalking
injunction against the son-in-law (referred in the case as "Husband") in First District
Court (the "First Action"). Without holding a hearing, the First District Court issued an
order denying Grandma's request, indicating there was "no immediate fear or alleged
threats." Seventeen days later, Grandmother filed a second request for a civil stalking
injunction, but this time it was filed in Fourth District Court (the "Second Action").
Following a hearing on Husband's timely request, the Fourth District Court issued an ex
parte temporary civil stalking injunction against Husband. Husband filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that the matter had been heard in the First District Court in the First
Action, which had denied the motion. Grandmother opposed the motion, acknowledging
that while the incidents alleged in the Second Action had been raised in the petition in the
First District Court case in the First Action, that no decision had been made on the merits
in the First Action. The Fourth District Court held an evidentiary hearing, and denied
Husband's motion to dismiss, on the grounds that the denial of Grandmother's
application for an ex parte stalking injunction in the First Action did not constitute an
21
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"adjudicatory proceeding that rose to the level of res judicata or collateral estoppel." (Id.
at 1061).
On appeal, Husband challenged the finding of the Fourth District Court, arguing
that the First District Court's dismissal of Grandmother's earlier petition in the First
Action barred the Fourth District Court from issuing an injunction predicated on the same
alleged stalking events, under the doctrines of res judicata and claims preclusion. The
Utah Court of Appeals reviewed the statutory procedures for obtaining a civil stalking
injunction, and concluded that Grandmother was barred from bringing the Second
Action, and that claims preclusion applies when three elements are satisfied:
( 1) both suits must involve the same parties or their privies, (2) the claim that is
alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or be one that could
and should have been raised in the first action, and (3) the first suit must have
resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Peterson v. Armstrong, 2014 UT App 247, ,r 11, 337 P.3d 1058, 1062 (citing Moss v.
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 2012 UT 42, ,r21, 285 P.3d 1157).

The Court in Peterson carefully examined whether the earlier finding by the First
District Court constituted a "final judgment on the merits." Preliminarily, the Court
noted that: (a) the Husband contended that the First District Court was a final judgment
on the merits because the trial court had determined that Grandmother had "not met her
burden to show that the offense [of stalking] had occurred" and that such finding should
be binding and preclude the Fourth District Court from a later determination on the same
issues; but (b) Grandmother argued that the First District's Court's denial of
Grandmother's motion was not "a final judgment on the merits" because Husband did not
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make an appearance and that the First District Court stated in its order that Grandmother
may consider other legal proceedings "to restrain [Husband's] conduct." The Court in
Peterson agreed with Husband in finding that claims preclusion applied and the First
District Court's denial was a "final judgment on the merits." The Court cited State v.
Summerville, 2013 UT App 40,297 P.3d 665 (claims preclusion "bars a party from
prosecuting in a subsequent action a claim that has been fully litigated previously," in
support of its finding, as follows:
"A judgment is upon the merits when it amounts to a declaration of the law as to
the respective rights and duties of the parties based on ... facts and evidence upon
which the rights of recovery depend, irrespective of formal, technical, or dilatory
objections or contentions." Sommerville, 2013 UT App 40, ,r 32,297 P.3d 665
(omission in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
To be on the merits, a judgment does not have to proceed to trial. Rather, a
judgment on the merits may be made at any stage of the litigation, so long as ...
[the judgment rendered is] based upon a proper application of the relevant law to
the facts of the case.
Id. (alteration and omission in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Furthermore, "[a] judgment is on the merits if it completely disposes of
an underlying cause of action, or determines that plaintiff has no cause of action."
Dennis v. Vasquez, 2003 UT App 168, ,r 8, 72 P.3d 135 (emphasis omitted)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)."
Peterson v. Armstrong, 2014 UT App 247, ,r 14, 337 P.3d 1058, 1063.
While the Court in Peterson acknowledges that there is little case law in this area,
and that no Utah appellate decisions involving the application of res judicata in the
context of the stalking injunction, it cites case law from other jurisdictions in support of
its findings. (Tortorello v. Tortorella, 113 Hawaii 432, 153 P .3d 1117, 1122-24
(applying res judicata to "protective order cases filed by the same petitioner against the
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same respondent" involving the same events; and Bumgardner v. Bumgardner, No.
CA2004-07-172, 2005 WL 1545790 (Ohio Ct.App. July 5, 2005 (involving an order from
a domestic commissioner, as in this case). Then the Court in Peterson concluded that "a
judgment on the merits may be made at any stage of the litigation ... " and (citing

Sommerville), and that "All that is required is that the party seeking to invoke claim
preclusion must establish that the earlier suit involved "the same parties or their privies
and the same cause of action." Id. at 1064 (citing Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, 99
P.3d 842).
The Court's holding in Peterson, while involving a different statute, applies to the
instant case. Appellee attended the hearing, and presented his version of events
pertaining to the Incident. Commissioner Blomquist made recommendations that a
protective order be entered against Appellee, which became an order. When Appellee
failed to timely object to the findings of the Commissioner, it became a final order.
Appellant believes the issues presented at the hearing on February 16, 2016, had
already been reviewed and ruled on by Commissioner Blomquist in the first hearing
described above. The findings of Commissioner Blomquist would be considered an order
of the Court, as they were not objected to by Appellee within the required statutory
period. Moreover, Appellant believes that, because of the earlier hearing and order,
Appellee was barred from litigating the issues pertaining to the protective order, under
the doctrines of claims preclusion and res judicata. Peterson v. Armstrong, 337 P.3d
1058 (2014).
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•

II.

By Allowing Mutual Protective Orders, The Trial Court Erred by
Acknowledging, but then Ignoring, the Applicability of Utah Code Ann.
§78B-7-108, without establishing the circumstances that would justify such an
order under the statute.
Early in the Hearing, the Court commented on the issues presented by two

protective order proceedings pertaining to one Incident, as follows:
THE COURT: So if the status quo continues, Mr. Jensen, which means in effect
there are competing protective orders, which the Legislature says can't happen
unless there's certain conditions that are met, but that nevertheless for- if there's
no harm to you, are you willing to continue this? (R. 370:7-11).
In making this observation, the Court appears to have been acknowledging the
application of Utah Code Ann. §78B-7-108, which addresses the requirements when
there are competing protective orders. It states:
"A Court may not grant a mutual order or mutual protective orders for protection
to opposing parties, unless each party:
(a) has filed an independent petition against the other for a protective order,
and both petitions have been served;
(b) makes a showing at a due process protective order hearing of abuse or
domestic violence committed by the other party; and
(c) demonstrates the abuse or domestic violence did not occur in selfdefense."
In addition, the above statute requires that, if the Court issues mutual protective orders,
that the "circumstances justifying those orders shall be documented in the case file."
At the conclusion of the Hearing, the Court found that: (a) the protective order in
this case against Appellant would remain in place; (b) the protective order was based on
the same Incident as the protective order against Appellee; and (c) that it "is very much
aware that the petitioner already has a protective order against him, and this will result in
protective orders against each of them, and rightfully so." (Emphasis added) (R. 439-
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441 ). The Court did not explain in his ruling why he felt competing protective orders,
pertaining to the same Incident, were "rightfully" in place.
In the instant case, it would appear from the Record that the first two requirements
of the above-referenced statute have been met-each party filed an independent petition
against the other for a protective order, which has been served on the other party, and
each party has made a showing at a due process hearing of abuse or domestic violence.
It is the two remaining requirements of this statute that must be examined. First, the
Court made no finding that Appellant had demonstrated that the alleged abuse by
Appellant was not "in self-defense." The issue of self-defense was never addressed in
the testimony of Appellee or in the ruling of the Court. In fact, the Court indicated:
"Now, regardless of throwing the first punch and all that melee that- or perhaps
melee is too strong of a word, but as that confrontation occurred and became
physical. .. " (R. 440).
Secondly, the Court's ruling in this matter and the case file fail to "document" the
circumstances justifying the protective order in this case which competes with a prior
protective order which is directly contrary to this order.
The earlier protective order issued as a result of the hearing in Commissioner
Blomquist's court was based on the same Incident on October 21, 2015. Accordingly,
the Court failed to comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §78B-7-107 by
failing to make specific findings concerning self-defense, and failing to properly
document the circumstances pertaining to the protective order.
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III.

•

The Court Erred by Not Granting a Continuance to Appellant in the
Circumstances, where the Court had previously ignored the statutory
requirements under Utah Code Ann. §78B-7-107, which were for the
protection of Appellant.

Appellant had engaged new counsel on this matter just a few days prior to the
scheduled hearing on February 16, 2016. New counsel entered an appearance on
Tuesday, February 9, 2016, and on the same day moved the Court for a continuance of
the hearing on February 16, 2016. Appellant's counsel indicated that he was out of town
in the days leading up to the hearing, and filed the motion for the continuance to enable
Appellant to line up key witnesses to the Incident and to properly prepare for the hearing.
Appellant had requested that Appellee stipulate to a continuance, and Appellee refused to
do so.
During the hearing, it became apparent to Appellant's counsel that the Court was
automatically allowing into evidence a number of exhibits that had been submitted by
Appellee, but as to which Appellee established no evidentiary basis for their admission,
nor had Appellee made an offer that the exhibits be entered. Appellee did not establish a
foundation for the documents, nor was Appellant given an opportunity to object to the
documents. When Appellant's counsel inquired of the Court as to whether these
documents had been automatically "admitted" into evidence, the Court responded
affirmatively. Conversely, however, when Appellant attempted to offer documents and a
video of the incident - all of which had been identified as proposed exhibits - the Court
would not allow these exhibits into evidence. This included medical records pertaining to
the treatment of Appellant as a result of the incident, which clearly showed significant
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injuries to Appellant. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the hearing, the Court
commented that Appellant had failed to present evidence showing his injuries,
notwithstanding the above and the testimony of Appellant and his mother concerning
Appellant's significant injuries. This observation was made by the Court,
notwithstanding that the Court had previously indicated that the question of whether
Respondent had suffered injuries only had marginal relevance (R. 439).
The Court apparently disregarded testimony from Appellant and his mother
concerning the injuries he suffered from the Incident, again indicating that Appellant
could have offered treatment records showing his injuries. Medical records pertaining to
Appellant's treatment resulting from the Incident, and describing Appellant's injuries
from the ·Incident, were submitted to the Court in advance of the hearing, but were
evidently not considered by the Court.
At the outset of the Hearing, Appellant's counsel renewed his client's motions for
a continuance of the hearing. A formal motion for continuance had been made by prior
counsel, Ross C. Anderson, on February 8, 2016, when Mr. Anderson entered an
appearance, and by current counsel, James C. Lewis, on February 10, 2016, the day after

Mr. Lewis made an appearance in the case. The motions for continuance both noted that
counsel had just made an appearance; that it was impracticable in the circumstances to
subpoena and call necessary witnesses to the hearing, including "eyewitnesses to the
attack by Petitioner against Respondent" pertaining to Incident; and that additional time
was needed to adequately prepare for the hearing. (R. 277-279; 297-299). In the
Renewed Motion to Continue filed by Mr. Lewis, it was noted that counsel was involved
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•

in trial preparation for at trial beginning the next month, and that he needed additional
time to subpoena witnesses. (R. 297-299).
The Court denied Appellant's motions to continue, concluding it was "not
necessary"; that the Peterson case was not applicable; that the Court was "not sure how
anyone would be prejudiced by having gone forward"; stating that there three witnesses
at the hearing who "observed what occurred" and, incorrectly, that "there were roofers
there ... there's no indication to the Court that any of these were proposed witnesses" (to
the Incident); that "there are statutory requirements to having a hearing" that the Court
attempted to meet "to the best of its ability"; that Appellee had not "waived the statutory
time factors"; and that Appellant's claims that there would be no "harm or bias" to
Appellee was "not a factor in giving a continuance." (R. 439-439). As argued below, the
Court ignored the Record in forming these conclusions.
First, there can be no question that Appellant was prejudiced by the Court's denial
of the motions to continue. As the Record clearly reflects, Appellant's counsel had just
days earlier entered an appearance, and there was clearly insufficient time in the
circumstances to subpoena witnesses to appear for the hearing. Appellant's counsel
made that clear in both the motions submitted to the Court and in renewing the motions at
the outset of the hearing. And, contrary to the conclusions asserted by the Court, the
Record reflects that Appellant planned to call witnesses who had observed the Incident;
this was reflected in the motions to continue that expressly mention eyewitnesses to the
Incident, a copy of a witness statement submitted by Appellant as an exhibit to his
Objection, and the reference to the written motions and need to call witnesses in
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•
counsel's renewed motion at the outset of the hearing. In making its ruling, the Court
concluded that Appellee was "more credible" than Appellant and his mother, Sonya

•

Ruflin; consequently, there is no question that the testimony of these other independent
witnesses pertaining to the Incident would have been extremely relevant to the question
of who was more credible as between Appellant and Appellee.

•

The Court's conclusions concerning the "statutory requirements to having a
hearing" is even more problematic. Utah Code Ann. §78B-7-107(1)(a)(f), the statutory
section to which the Court presumably was alluding, sets forth the statutory requirement
for a hearing as follows:
"(f)

If the hearing on the petition is heard by a commissioner, either the
petitioner or respondent may file an objection within 10 days of the entry of
the recommended order and the assigned judge shall hold a hearing within
20 days of the filing of the objection."

It is clear from the Record that the Court did not schedule a hearing to occur
within twenty (20) days as required by the statutory language above. The initial

•

objection was filed on December 17, 2015, and an amendment to the objection was filed
on December 22, 2015. Even if the amendment is construed to extend the date of the
hearing, the Court would have been required to schedule the hearing no later than January
11, 2016, to meet the requirements of the statute; the hearing did not occur until February
16, 2016. Neither Appellant nor Appellee objected to the scheduling of the hearing on
this date, or demanded that the hearing date be changed to meet the requirements of the
statute.

•
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While the Court concluded that Appellee had not agreed to "waive the statutory
time factors," the reality is that the statutory requirements for a hearing within twenty
(20) days were simply not met by the Court, and that Appellee did not object to the
Court's failure to meet the requirements. This failure by the Court to meet the statutory
requirements and Appellee's failure to demand a hearing within the statutory period
constituted a waiver. Moreover, when Appellant counsel again sought the continuance at
the outset of the hearing, the Court inquired if Appellee would agree to a continuance,
and in doing so noted that the "two orders [would stay in effect until we hear this." In
making this observation, the Court made it clear that Appellee would continue to have the
protections afforded Appellee pending the outcome of a continued hearing.
Consequently, while the Court appeared to recognize that Appellee would suffer no harm
or prejudice if a continuance were granted, the Court nevertheless denied the motion
when Appellee would not stipulate, invoking the statutory requirement that had not been
met by the Court.
The simpler reality is: that the Court had not met the statutory requirements for a
hearing, that neither party had objected to that failure, and that an additional continuance
of a few days to allow Appellant to prepare and call additional witnesses to the Incident
would not have further violated the statutory requirement or caused Appellee any
prejudice. Conversely, the denial of the motion clearly prejudiced Appellant and his
counsel's ability to prepare for the hearing and to call key witnesses who were present
and observed the Incident.
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•
The denials of a motion to continue is generally a matter of discretion with the
Court. A trial court has substantial discretion in deciding whether to grant a continuance.
Clarke v. Clarke, 2012 UT App 328, ,I 19, 292 P.3d 76. We will conclude that a trial
court has abused that discretion only if the decision to grant or deny a continuance is
"clearly unreasonable and arbitrary." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Vaughan v. Romander, 2015 UT App 244, ,I 10, 360 P.3d 761, 764.
However, in this instance, the denial involved the incorrect interpretation or
application, of a statutory provision, which would be an issue reviewed de novo by this
Court.
Appellant recognizes now, and recognized when the request for a continuance was
made, that protective order matters require hearings within a specified period (twenty
days), in the absence of a stipulation by the parties; however, the subject statute clearly
would have allowed for a short continuance of a few days that would have enabled
Appellant to have these key, independent witnesses present for the hearing. If they had
been able to testify, these three witnesses, who were completely unrelated to Appellant,
would have testified that Appellee was the aggressor who initiated an assault on
Appellant; that is reflected in their statements which are part of the Record. (R. 73-75,
80-81 ). The Court's unwillingness to grant a short continuance in these circumstances
was extremely prejudicial to Appellant- leading, Appellant believes, to the Court's
conclusion that Appellee was "more credible" than Appellant and his mother.
Conversely, granting the continuance would have caused no prejudice whatever to
Appellee. Notwithstanding these circumstances - i.e., no time for Appellant to subpoena
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•
or make arrangements for witnesses - the Court in making its ruling commented that
Appellant could have had other witnesses present to testify concerning the incident, when
it was clear from Appellant's submittal that that was not possible. Consequently,
Appellant suffered substantial prejudice in his ability to present his case.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, for all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the trial court's order, order a new hearing and for all other relief as
this Court deems just and appropriate.
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Protective Order

Name of Petitioner
TIMOTHY RODNEY RUFLIN

Court:

3rd District Court Salt Lake

Case No:
County:

154907374

District:

THIRD

SALT LAKE

State:

Utah

Judge:

RICHARD MCKELVIE

Name of Respondent
CRAIG ALAN JENSEN

Address: 4594 CREEK VIEW DRIVE, MURRAY,
Address: 2887 WESTERLING WAY, SALT LAKE
UT 84107
CITY, UT 84121
Phone#: 801-946-5110
Phone#: 801-608-0924
Date of Birth: 04-19-1967
Date of Birth: 08-05-1981
Petitioner's Attorney:
Respondent's Attorney:
_A_tt_o_rn_e__'_s_P_h_on_e_:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Attorney's Phone:
Other Person(s) Protected by this Order:
Respondent Identifying Information:

Sex:M

Race: White
Weight: 250 lbs
Height: 5 ft 11 in
Eyes: Blue
Hair: Brown
Date of Birth: 04-19-1967 SSN:
Driver License #:
State:
Expiration:
Distinguishing Features (Scars, Marks, Tattoos, etc):
Tattoo upper arm and right ankle
Other Names Used:

The Court orders the Respondent to obey all orders specified on this document and to not abuse or threaten
to abuse anyone protected by this order.
The criminal orders specified on this document do not expire unless dismissed by the Court.

Warnings:
•This is a court order. No one except the court can change it. If you do not obey this order, you can be arrested,
fined, and face other charges.
•This order is valid in all U.S. states and territories, the District of Columbia, and tribal lands. If you go to
another U.S. state, territory or tribal land to violate this order, a federal judge can send you to prison.
•No guns or firearms!
•Warning! It is a federal crime for you to have, possess, transport, ship, or receive any firearm or ammunition,
including hunting weapons, while this protective order is in effect.
The Respondent must obey all orders entered on this document
If you do not obey the criminal orders below, the court can send you to jail for up to 1 year and order you to pay
a fine. A second or subsequent violation can result in more severe penalties.
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There was a hearing on: NOVEMBER 30, 2015. The Respondent was given notice and an opportunity to
be heard in the hearing that gave rise to this order. The following people were present at the hearing:
-Petitioner
-Petitioner's attorney: COBIE SPEVAK
-Respondent

(i)

The Court reviewed the Request for Protective Order and:
-received argument and evidence,

i>
2

Do not commit, try to commit or threaten to commit any form of violence against the Petitioner or any
person listed on this order. This includes stalking, harassing, threatening, physically hurting, or causing
any other form of abuse.

3

Do not contact, phone, mail, e-mail, or communicate in any way with the Petitioner, either directly or
indirectly.

4

Stay away from: The Petitioner's current or future vehicle, job, school, home, premises and property:
Home, Premises, and property: 4594 CREEK VIEW DRIVE, MURRAY, UT 84107
Work:
School:
Vehicle Description: 2006 CHEVEY SILVERADO (BLUE)

5

Stay away from: The school or childcare of the children included in this order.

(i)

Current addresses include, but are not limited to:

Other (specify): (MOM'S ADDRESS) 2796 E BANBURY RD, COTTONWOOD HEIGHTS,
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL CENTER - TOSH UNIT, HEARING AND BALANCE CENTER
AND PHYSICAL THERAPY UNIT.
6

The Court finds that your use or possession of a weapon poses a serious threat of harm to the Petitioner.
You cannot possess, have, or buy a gun or firearm or any of these weapons: GUNS OR KNIVES

7

Unless a judicial officer makes a different order later, only the Petitioner can use, control and possess the
following property and things, but cannot dispose of this property without court approval:
Home at (describe): 4594 CREEK VIEW DRIVE, MURRAY, UT 84107
Car, truck, or other property (describe): 2006 CHEVEY SILVERADO (BLUE)

8

You must obey the following civil orders made by the judicial officer.
If you do not, you will be in contempt of court and may be punished. These orders will EXPIRE in 15 0
days.

9

Do not interfere with or change the Petitioner's phone, utility, or other services.
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Notice to Petitioner
In 2 years, the Respondent may ask the Court to dismiss the orders on this document. If that happens, we will
need your address so the Court can give you notice. If your address changes, you must let the Court know at
least 30 days before the 2-year period ends.

(j

If you receive services from the Office of Recovery Services (ORS) and want to keep your address
confidential, you must give ORS a copy of your current Protective Order.
The court may amend or dismiss a protective order after one year if it finds that the basis for the issuance of the
protective order no longer exists and the petitioner has repeatedly acted in contravention of the protective order
provisions to intentionally or knowingly induce the respondent to violate the protective order, demonstrating to
the court that the petitioner no longer has a reasonable fear of the respondent.
Dated: November 30, 2015
11:29:49 AM
Dated: November 30, 2015
11:30:16 AM

•
•
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Protective Order

Court:
Case No:

3rd District Court Salt Lake
154906899
District:

County:

SALT LAKE
ANDREW H STONE

Judge:

•

State:

THIRD
Utah

Name of Petitioner
CRAIG ALAN JENSEN

Name of Respondent
TIMOTHY RUFFLIN

Address: 2887 EAST WESTERLING WAY,

Address: 4594 SOUTH CREEKVIEW DRIVE,
MURRAY, UT84107

COTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT84121
Phone#: 801-608-0924
Date of Birth: 04-19-1967

•

Phone#:
Date of Birth:
Petitioner's Attorney:
Respondent's Attorney:
_A_tt_o_m_e.....'_s_P_h_o_ne_:______________ Attorney's Phone:
Other Person(s) Protected by this Order:
Respondent Identifying Information:

•

Name: HK J
Relationship to Respondent: Other

Age:

Name: J HJ
Relationship to Respondent: Other

Age:

Name: CATHERINE JENSEN
Relationship to Respondent: Other

Age:

Sex: M
Race: White
Height: 5 ft 10 in
Weight: 170 lbs
Brown
Hair:
Eyes:
SSN:
Date of Birth:
Driver License#:
State:
Expiration:
Distinguishing Features (Scars, Marks, Tattoos, etc):
carry&#39;s a cane

Other Names Used:

•

The Court orders the Respondent to obey all orders specified on this document and to not abuse or threaten
to abuse anyone protected by this order.
The criminal orders specified on this document do not expire unless dismissed by the Court.

•

Warnings:
•This is a court order. No one except the court can change it. If you do not obey this order, you can be arrested,
fined, and face other charges.
•This order is valid in all U.S. states and territories, the District of Columbia, and tribal lands. If you go to
another U.S. state, territory or tribal land to violate this order, a federal judge can send you to prison.
•No guns or firearms!
•Warning! It is a federal crime for you to have, possess, transport, ship, or receive any firearm or ammunition,
including hunting weapons, while this protective order is in effect.
The Respondent must obey all orders entered on this document
If you do not obey the criminal orders below, the court can send you to jail for up to 1 year and order you to pay
a fine. A second or subsequent violation can result in more severe penalties.

AS
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1

There was a hearing on : DECEMBER 3, 2015. The Respondent was given notice and an opportunity to
be heard in the hearing that gave rise to this order. The following people were present at the hearing:
-Petitioner
-Petitioner's attorney: COBIE SPEVAK
-Respondent
The Court reviewed the Request for Protective Order and:
-received argument and evidence,

2

Do not commit, try to commit or threaten to commit any form of violence against the Petitioner or any
person listed on this order. This includes stalking, harassing, threatening, physically hurting, or causing
any other form of abuse.

3

Do not contact, phone, mail, e-mail, or communicate in any way with the Petitioner, either directly or
indirectly.

4

Stay away from: The Petitioner's current or future vehicle, job, school, home, premises and property:
Home, Premises, and property: 2887 EAST WESTERLING WAY, COTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT
84121
Work:
School:
Vehicle Description: 1999 WHITE CHEVY SILVERADO PICKUP TRUCK ALSO MAROON 2002

5

The Court finds that your use or possession of a weapon poses a serious threat of harm to the Petitioner.
You cannot possess, have, or buy a gun or firearm or any of these weapons: GUNS

6

You must obey the following civil orders made by the judicial officer.
If you do not, you will be in contempt of court and may be punished. These orders will in days.

Notice to Petitioner
In 2 years, the Respondent may ask the Court to dismiss the orders on this document. If that happens, we will
need your address so the Court can give you notice. If your address changes, you must let the Court know at
least 30 days before the 2-year period ends.
If you receive services from the Office of Recovery Services (ORS) and want to keep your address
confidential, you must give ORS a copy of your current Protective Order.
The court may amend or dismiss a protective order after one year if it finds that the basis for the issuance of the
protective order no longer exists and the petitioner has repeatedly acted in contravention of the protective order
provisions to intentionally or knowingly induce the respondent to violate the protective order, demonstrating to
the court that the petitioner no longer has a reasonable fear of the respondent.

Dated: December 03, 2015
11:06:51 AM
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@

Dated: December 03, 2015
11:07:16 AM

@
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FILED DISTRICT COURT

A-8

Third Judlclal District
FEB 17 2016
By

llAll'LAIC&~

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CRAIG ALAN JENSEN,

MINUTE ENTRY

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 154906899

vs.
Judge Paul G. Maughan

TIMOTHY RUFFLIN,
Respondent.

An evidentiary hearing was held on the 16 th day of February, 2016 to
consider the

respondent's

Objection to

Commissioner's Order.

The

petitioner, Craig Alan Jensen, was present prose, and Timothy Rufflin
was present and represented by his attorney, James C. Lewis. Following
the presentation of evidence by each party, the Court entered its oral
findings on the record pursuant to U.R.C.P. 52(a) and determined that the
petitioner had met his burden of establishing that he was entitled to a
Protective Order.

•

The Court hereby overrules the respondent's Objection.

The Protective Order previously entered by the Commissioner and the
Court will remain in full force and effect.

This Minute Entry
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•
JENSEN V. RUFFLIN
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MINUTE ENTRY

constitutes the Order of the Court regarding the respondent's Objection,
no further Order is required.
Dated this

_}_J_ day

of

•
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JENSEN V. RUFFLIN

PAGE 3

MINUTE ENTRY

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

hereby certify that I emailed/mailed a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this

./2_ day

of February,

2016:

Craig Alan Jensen
Prose
2887 E. Westerling Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
James C. Lewis
Attorney for Respondent
8 E. Broadway, Suite 410
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
jlewis@lewishansen.com
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